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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Edward Herbert Hoid appeals from the district court's order denying his
Motion To Amend Judgment, in which Hoid requested that the district court give
him credit against his sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of
probation.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
In 2002, Hoid pied guilty to issuing an insufficient funds check. (R., p.41.)
The district court withheld judgment and placed Hoid on probation for three
years. (R., pp.41-45.) As a condition of probation, Hoid was ordered to serve
180 days in jail but was given credit against his jail time for 70 days of
presentence incarceration. (R., p.42.)
On February 1, 2004, Hoid was arrested on a bench warrant for a
probation violation.

(R., pp.70-71, 159.)

violated his probation.

Hoid ultimately admitted to having

(R., pp.80-81.) The district court revoked the withheld

judgment and imposed a unified sentence of three years with one year fixed, but
suspended the sentence and reinstated Hoid on probation with the condition that
he serve an additional 120 days in jail. (R., pp.85-89.) The order revoking the
withheld judgment stated: "For record purposes only, the defendant is entitled to
credit for two hundred forty-four (244) days served prior to sentencing. Sentence
shall commence on April 5, 2004." (R., p.86.)
On November 18, 2004, Hoid was again arrested on a bench warrant for a
probation violation.

(R., pp.95-96, 159.)
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After Hoid admitted violating his

probation, the district court revoked his probation, executed his sentence and
retained jurisdiction.

(R., pp.110-12.)

The order revoking probation and

retaining jurisdiction stated: "For record purposes only, the defendant is entitled
to credit for three hundred ninety (390) days served as of December 13, 2004."
(R., p.111.)
Following the period of retained jurisdiction, the district court suspended
the balance of Hoid's sentence and reinstated him on probation. (R., pp.11720.)

The order of probation stated:

"For record purposes, the defendant is

entitled to credit for five hundred seventy two (572) days served as of June 13,
2005." (R., p.118.)
On October 3, 2005, the state filed a motion for probation violation,
alleging, inter alia, that Hoid had absconded supervision. (R., pp.128-30.) The
court issued a bench warrant, but Hoid was not arrested on the warrant until April
2, 2011. (R., pp.133-34, 159.) Hoid subsequently admitted to having violated
his probation by absconding.

(R., pp.143-44.)

The district court revoked his

probation and ordered his sentence executed. (R., pp.149-52.) In so doing, the
court advised Hoid that it would give him only that credit for time served to which
he was absolutely entitled under Idaho law.

(6/20/11 Tr., p.31, L.22 - p.32,

L.13.) Ultimately, the court gave Hoid "credit for four hundred twenty-two (422)
days served as of the 20

th

day of June, 2011" (R., p.151), reflecting the number

of days Hoid served before sentencing, during the retained jurisdiction period
and awaiting disposition on his numerous probation violations (R., p.159). The
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court did not give Hoid credit for any jail time he served a condition of his
probation. (R., pp.158-59.)
On July 19, 2011, Hoid filed a Motion To Amend Judgment, requesting
that he be given credit against his sentence for the jail time he served as a
condition of his probation. (R., pp.156-58.) Hoid argued that the court's June
14, 2005 order placing him on probation "gave [him] 572 days credit for time
served" and, as such, he was "legally entitled to that credit" and the court did "not
have jurisdiction to ... change the amount of credit it gave Mr. Hoid several years
ago."

(R., p.157.)

The district court denied the motion without a hearing,

reasoning that Hoid was not legally entitled to credit for the jail time he served as
a condition of probation, and explaining that the calculation of credit for time
served in its prior orders was for record keeping purposes only, to enable the
court "to keep track of the maximum credit for time served which it could give" if
and when Hoid's prison sentence was executed; it was not a final determination
of the credit to Hoid would receive upon his commitment to prison. (R., p.158
(emphasis original).)

Because Hoid "never submitted to supervision by the

Department of Probation & Parole" during his periods of probation, the district
court determined that Hoid was "neither entitled [to] nor deserving of' credit
against his prison sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of
probation. (Id. (emphasis original).) Hoid timely appeals. (R., pp.162-65.)
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ISSUE
Hoid states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Hoid's Motion To
Amend The Judgment because it had previously included 230 days
served as a condition of probation, and to take the time away
results in an increase of Mr. Hoid's sentence?
(Appellant's brief, p.4.)
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as:
Has Hoid failed to show that the district court erred by declining to give him credit
against his sentence for the jail time he served as a condition of his probation?
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ARGUMENT
Hoid Has Failed To Show That The District Court Erred By Declining
To Give Him Credit Against His Sentence For Jail Time He Served
As A Condition Of Probation
A.

Introduction
The district court denied Hoid's motion to amend the judgment, in which

Hoid requested that he be given credit against his sentence for the jail time he
served as a condition of probation. (R., pp.156-59.) Hoid concedes that he was
not entitled to such credit under Idaho Code § 18-309. (Appellant's brief, pp.58.) He argues, however, that because the district court's April 2004, December
2004 and June 2005 orders gave him credit for the time he served as a condition
of probation, "the district court lacked authority to take away the credit because
that would essentially increase Mr. Hoid's sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.7-8.)
Hoid's argument fails.

The district court interpreted its April 2004, December

2004 and June 2005 orders as providing a calculation of credit for time served
for record keeping purposes only, such that the court was not required to give
Hoid such credit upon finally revoking his probation and ordering his sentence
executed in June 2011. Hoid has not even argued, much less demonstrated,
that the court's interpretation of its own orders is clearly erroneous. Having failed
to do so, Hoid has failed to establish that the district court erred in denying his
motion to give him credit for time served that had never previously been granted
and to which he was not entitled under Idaho law.
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B.

Standard Of Review
"The question of whether a sentencing court has properly awarded credit

for time served to the facts of a particular case is a question of law, which is
subject to free review by the appellate courts." State v. Vasquez, 142 Idaho 67,
68, 122 P.3d 1167, 1168 (Ct. App. 2005) (citing State v. Hale, 116 Idaho 763,
779 P.2d 438 (Ct. App. 1989)).
The interpretation of an unambiguous court order presents a question of
law over which the appellate court exercises free review. Suchan v. Suchan, 113
Idaho 102, 106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986); Sun Valley Ranches. Inc. v. Prairie
Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d 1292, 1298 (Ct. App.
1993). The interpretation of an ambiguous court order presents a question of
fact.

Suchan, 113 Idaho at 106, 741 P.2d at 1293.

Where the order is

reasonably subject to conflicting interpretations, the appellate court must accept
the trial court's interpretation, particularly when the trial court is interpreting its
own order, unless that interpretation is clearly erroneous.

~

at 107-08, 741

P.2d at 1294-95 (citations omitted).

C.

The District Court Was Not Required Upon Executing Hoid's Sentence To
Give Hoid Credit For The Jail Time He Served As A Condition Of
Probation
Under Idaho law an inmate is entitled to credit for time served if he is

incarcerated on that sentence. I.C. § 18-309; Muchow v. State, 142 Idaho 401,
403, 128 P.3d 938, 940 (2006); Taylor v. State, 145 Idaho 866, 869, 187 P.3d
1241, 1244 (Ct. App. 2008). He is not entitled to credit for time served if he is
not incarcerated but is instead on probation or parole. I.C. § 18-309; I.C. § 19-
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2603 (time spent "at large under [a] suspended sentence shall not be counted as
a part of the term of his sentence"); I.C. § 20-209A ("time during which the
person is voluntarily absent from the penitentiary, jail, facility under the control of
the board of correction, or from the custody of an officer after his sentence, shall
not be estimated or counted as a part of the term for which he was sentenced");
Taylor, 145 Idaho at 869, 187 P.3d at 1244 (I.C. § 18-309 "notably does not base
credit on any factor other than actual incarceration"). Nor is he entitled to credit
against his sentence for time actually spent incarcerated during his probation if
such incarceration was imposed as a condition of probation. State v. Dana, 137
Idaho 6, 8, 43 P.3d 765, 767 (2002).
Upon finally executing Hoid's sentence in June 2011, the court gave Hoid
credit for 422 days served, reflecting the number of days Hoid spent incarcerated
before sentencing, during the retained jurisdiction period and awaiting disposition
on his numerous probation violations. (R., pp.151, 159.) The court did not give
Hoid credit for any of the jail time he served as a condition of his probation,
reasoning that Hoid was neither entitled to nor deserving of any credit in addition
to that expressly provided for by law.

(R., pp.158-59.)

Hoid claims this was

error, arguing as he did below that the court was required to give him credit for
the jail time he served as a condition of probation because the court had
awarded such credit in its prior orders and "to take away the credit ... essentially
increase[d] Mr. Hoid's sentence." (Appellant's brief, pp.5-8.)

Hoid's argument

fails on its premise; the plain language of the prior orders supports the district
court's determination that the calculation of credit for time served contained
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therein was for record keeping purposes only and was not a final determination
of the credit to which Hoid was entitled upon his commitment to prison.
"The rules of construction of contracts and written documents in general
apply to the interpretation of court orders." Suchan v. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102,
106, 741 P.2d 1289, 1293 (1986) (citations omitted); see also Sun Valley
Ranches, Inc. v. Prairie Power Cooperative, Inc., 124 Idaho 125, 131, 856 P.2d
1292, 1298 (Ct. App. 1993).

Thus, like the interpretation of a contract, the

interpretation of a court order begins with its plain language. See, ~ . Weisel v.
Beaver Springs Owners Ass'n, Inc., 152 Idaho 519, _ , 272 P.3d 491, 500
(2012) ("Courts look to the language of the contract to determine intent."
(citations omitted)). "If the language is plain and unambiguous, interpretation is a
matter of law, and this Court will give the [order] its plain meaning."

kL. (citation

omitted). If, on the other hand, the language of the order is reasonably subject
to conflicting interpretations, the order is ambiguous and this Court must accept
the trial court's interpretation of its own order, unless that interpretation is clearly
erroneous. Suchan, 113 Idaho at 107-08, 741 P.2d at 1294-95 (citing I.R.C.P.
52(a); Rueth v. State, 103 Idaho 74, 77, 644 P.2d 1333 (1982); Javernick v.
Smith, 101 Idaho 104,106,609 P.2d 171, 173 (1980)).
The district court's April 2004 and December 2004 orders both explicitly
state that the calculation of credit for time served contained therein was "For
record purposes only." (R., pp.86, 111.) Likewise, the court's June 2005 order
that reinstated Hoid on probation following a period of retained jurisdiction states
that the calculation of credit for time served contained therein was "For record

8

purposes." (R., p.118.) Thus, contrary to Hoid's assertions below and on appeal
that the court's prior orders actually gave him credit for the jail time he served as
a condition of probation, the plain language of the orders makes clear that the
calculation of credit for time served contained therein was for record keeping
purposes only.
That the court was only keeping track of the total number of days Hoid
had spent incarcerated (including as a condition of probation) and not actually
awarding Haid credit for those days makes sense because none of the orders at
issue constituted a final order committing Haid to the exclusive custody of the
Department of Correction. Instead, two of the orders (April 2004 and June 2005)
reinstated Hoid on probation, and the other (December 2005) was an order
retaining jurisdiction, leaving open the possibility that Haid would again be placed
on probation and would not have to serve the entirety of his sentence. If the
court had intended in its April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders to
actually award Haid credit for all the time he served before his probation was
finally revoked and his sentence executed (including the days served as a
condition of probation), it could easily have done so by using language, such as
that contained in the court's final commitment order, that "The defendant shall
receive credit for" the total number of days served in connection with the
underlying offense. (See R., p.151 (emphasis added).) The court did not do so,
however, and stated instead that the calculation of credit for time served prior to
Hoid's final commitment was "For record purposes" (R., p.118) or "For record
purposes only" (R., pp.86, 111). The plain language of the court's prior orders
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thus supports the district court's determination that Hoid had never actually been
awarded any credit for the jail time he served as a condition of probation and, as
such, the court was not required to give Hoid such credit upon finally revoking his
probation and ordering his sentence executed.
Even if the court's April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders are
subject to conflicting interpretations, the district court's interpretation of those
orders as having not actually awarded Hoid credit for time served is reasonable.
The court explained:
It is within this Court's discretion (in an exercise of its mercy) to
grant credit for time served in addition to that required by law. This
Court does more often than not, when it thinks it appropriate, grant
additional credit for time served beyond that required by law in the
situation in which a probationer submits to supervision by a
probation officer and attempts to succeed on probation, but simply
fails over time to make sufficient progress on probation for lack of
ability or sufficient effort. When this Court does give additional
credit for time, such additional credit is included in the final
commitment order. For orders prior to a final commitment order, in
addition to its own internal record keeping in the court-file, the
Court will usually include language (in the order which reinstates a
defendant on probation) to the effect: "For record purposes only,
the defendant is entitled to _
days credit for time served as of
(date)." This Court has used this procedure for many years when
reinstating a defendant on probation to keep track of the maximum
credit for time served which it could give If and when it becomes
appropriate at ~ later date under appropriate circumstances to give
such additional or maximum credit on the occasion of sending a
defendant to prison and entering a final commitment order. Such
has been the intent of the quoted language above; it has not been
the intent of such language to give credit for time served at a time
when the sentence has been suspended and before such time as it
is imposed.
(R., p.158 (emphasis original).) Even if ambiguous, the language of the court's
April 2004, December 2004 and June 2005 orders reasonably supports the
district court's conclusion that the calculation of credit for time served contained
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in those orders was for record keeping purposes only and was not a final
determination of the credit to which Hoid was entitled upon his final commitment
to prison.

Haid has not even cited the district court's reasoning, much less

demonstrated that it is clearly erroneous. This Court must therefore accept the
district court's interpretation of its own orders as providing a calculation of credit
for time served for record keeping purposes only, and not as a final
determination of Hoid's entitlement to such credit upon final execution of his
sentence. Suchan, 113 Idaho 102 at 107-08, 741 P.2d at 1294-95.
The district court correctly interpreted its own prior orders in concluding
that Hoid was not entitled to credit against his sentence for the jail time he
served as a condition of probation.

Hoid has failed to show any basis for

reversal of the court's order denying his Motion to Amend Judgment.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's
order denying Hoid's Motion To Amend Judgment.
DATED this 2

nd

day of October 2012.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 2 nd day of October 2012, served a
true and correct copy of the attached BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by causing a
copy addressed to:
DIANE M. WALKER
DEPUTY STATE APP ELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
to be placed in The State Appellate Public Defender's basket located in the
Idaho Supreme Court Clerk's office.

I A. FLEMINJG
Deputy Attorney Gen
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